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What matters more for South African 







While the increased access to consumer credit has helped many families 
improve their welfare, the rising repayment burdens upon a background of 
chronically law savings rate have generated concerns that South African 
families are becoming ever more financially fragile and less able to meet their 
consumer debt repayment obligations. Using data from the Cape Area Panel 
Study (CAPS), this paper investigates whether consumer debt repayment 
problems are better explained by excessive spending which leaves households 
financial overstretched or by negative income shocks. The results indicate that 
households are significantly more likely to be delinquent on their financial 
obligations when they suffer negative events beyond their control rather than 
due to the size of the expenditure burden. This suggests that some consumers 
will experience repayment problems even when they borrow within their means. 
Thus regulatory efforts to improve mechanisms for debt relief might be more 





The rising cost of living upon a background of increasing dependencies has 
meant that disproportionately large amounts household incomes are being 
commitment to consumption expenditure rather than saving. While the 
increased access to credit means that families can easily supplement this 
consumption expenditure, the rising consumer debt burdens have brought forth 
concerns that families are becoming more financially fragile and less able to 
meet debt repayment obligation when due.  
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The debt repayment performance of households is not only an important 
indicator of the financial health of the household sector, but also an influential 
driver of the consumer protection policy debate. In South Africa, the debate has 
tended to focus largely on the behaviours of the credit market which allow 
consumers to borrow beyond their means and becoming financial overextended. 
In response, government policy has focused largely on ‘prevention’ of these 
behaviours through an unprecedented enforcement of affordability evaluation, 
consumer information and disclosure, and sanctions for reckless lending under 
the National Credit Act (NCA). 
    
In spite of this, based on the National Credit Regulator (NCR) data1, the average 
credit standing of consumers has only continued to deteriorate in tandem with 
rising incidences of litigation judgements and administration orders since the 
NCA came into full force in June 2007 (Figure 1). Such a trend generates a 
feeling that perhaps restrictions on lending might not be the ultimate antidote to 
consumer debt problems. Given the profit motive and loss aversion, lenders 





Figure 1: Credit standing of consumers (June 2007 - March 2014). 
																																								 																				



























	 3  
	
Assuming that lenders adhere to the strict lending regulations and painstakingly 
evaluate consumers’ creditworthiness, then delinquencies are less likely occur 
due to excessive borrowing but rather due to interruptions or alteration in 
consumers’ income streams ex-post.  
 
Lenders might be able to quantify a consumer’s ability and willingness to repay 
the debt when due. However, they will not be able to predict the occurrence of 
negative situational change which will render consumers incapable of 
committing to their repayment obligations. The concurrence of factors beyond 
lenders’ and consumers’ control may result in severe repayment difficulties 
even where consumers borrow within their means. Hence, consumer debt 
delinquencies are more complex than the mere fact that consumers are spending 
excessively.  
 
This contention is address by examining data on South African households. The 
key contribution is to establish whether consumer debt delinquencies are more 
likely to result from households spending excessively and rendering themselves 
financially overstretched or from unfortunate events that erode repayment 
capacity. The results of the investigation should stimulate discussion on the 
current consumer credit regulatory framework as to the role of regulation, and 
as to the form regulation might take. 
 
In terms of theory, consumer debt delinquencies are not strategic, rather, they 
are a consequence of a genuine inability to pay when household resources 
become too strained to support the household’s ongoing subsistence while 
meeting scheduled repayments. This is related to the ‘cash flow’ theory of 
defaults which is based on the assumption that debtors will avoid arrears as long 
as their income flows are sufficient to cover their debt repayments without 
undue financial stress (Alfaro et al., 2010; Bhutta et al., 2010). Hence, the 
behaviour of both the transitory income and monthly debt-service ratio should 
explain empirically overall consumer debt repayment performance of 
households.  
 
Following an empirical strategy similar to Peter & Peter (2006) for the default 
risk of Australian home buyers, the study proceeds to examine the relative 
importance of excessive spending and negative income shock on borrowers’ 
delinquency in South African ‒ controlling for the assumption that  some ‘types’ 
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of households are more likely to pay their due obligations than others. The study 
progresses as follows: some existing literature on debt delinquency is presented 
followed by the variables definition and data analysis. The results of the analysis 
are presented followed by conclusions and implications. Throughout the paper, 
the terms ‘delinquency’ and ‘repayment problems’ are mutually 
interchangeable to refer to the inability to pay financial obligations when due or 
be in arrears.  
 
 
2. Literature review 
	
There has been scanty formal analysis of household debt repayment in South 
Africa but there is substantial literature on the situation internationally. 
Regarding the specific factors behind consumer debt delinquency, a number of 
studies have blamed lending and borrowing practices that allow some 
consumers to over-burden themselves with more debt than they can afford. 
Predatory behaviours by lenders and/or the lack of self-control, financial 
illiteracy or irrational optimism about future income in respect of consumers are 
some of the behaviours cited (e.g., Jentzsch & Riestra, 2006; Gathergood, 2012). 
Alternatively, ex-post misfortunes or adverse trigger events often unanticipated 
during credit screening such as medical emergencies, or sudden unemployment 
can also contribute to delinquencies even where consumers borrow reasonable 
amounts (e.g., Getter, 2003; Avery et al., 2004).  
 
A study by Hurwitz & Luiz (2007) identifies that both factors play an active 
role in South African borrowers’ delinquency. On one side are cautious 
households forced to abandon their financial obligations due to emergencies 
that strain their cash flows, and then there are those who exhibit a ‘reckless 
culture of non-payment’ driven by short-sightedness, the low levels of formal 
education and financial literacy (ibid: 114).  
 
Additionally, there are a few studies that model arrears on the legal costs, the 
efficiency of the debt collection mechanism and/or the possible sanctions for 
defaulting. 
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2.1 Excessive consumption 
	
Some consumers will take on an unreasonable amount of debt (either knowingly 
or otherwise) and later find themselves financially overstretched and unable to 
repay (Bertaut et al., 2009; Zhu, 2011). Such behaviour might result from, 
simply overestimating the immediate benefits of the credit or undervaluing the 
cost of the debt repayment (Meier & Sprenger, 2007; Heidhues & Kőszegi, 
2010), a lack of self-control or a low level of knowledge about financial matters 
( Hurwitz & Luiz, 2007; Gathergood, 2012). 
 
 Some external market factors might also influence consumers to spend 
excessively, for instance they might be influenced by falling interest rates ( e.g., 
Guttmann & Plihon, 2010), or by inflated expectations of future earnings 
(Hoffmann et al., 2012; Bachmann et al., 2015). Moreover, lax lending criteria 
that might allow an already over-stretched debtor to qualify for more debt can 
also be cited (e.g., James, 2012). Particularly, lenders’ non-disclosure of 
important credit information and other deceptive practices might impair 
consumers’ decision making (Hill & Kozup, 2007; Bertrand et al., 2010).   
Empirically, the relative effect of excessive spending on the debt repayment 
performance, has been investigated using different proxies for the level of 
indebtedness, notably, the size of the purchase (Godwin, 1999), the size of the 
credit balance and credit limit (Gross & Souleles, 2002; Lopes, 2008), the 
number of credit commitments held (Whitley et al., 2004; Disney et al., 2008) 
or the debt-service ratio (Getter, 2003; Alfaro et al., 2010; Farinha & Lacerda, 
2010). It is worth noting that the inability to find a universal indicator of 
excessive spending could be interpreted as result of data limitations rather than 
a personal choice. According to Getter (2003), the debt-service ratio would be 
a more sound measure as, it allows for a more accurate comparison of the 
household’s immediate financial stress. 
 
With regards to the policy implications, if delinquency results from excessive 
spending, it would suggest a failure of the pre-contractual regulatory 
mechanism thereby incentivizing irresponsible lending practices (Ho & 
Pennington-Cross, 2006; Stoop, 2009; Campbell et al., 2011).   
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2.2 Socio-economic shocks 
	
Even consumers who take on a ‘reasonable’ amount of debt, with every 
intention (and means) to repay may face repayment difficulties. Misfortunes or 
financially adverse events that befall households from time to time often cause 
substantial declines in income which renders them suddenly incapable of 
committing to their repayment obligations (Himmelstein et al., 2005; Getter, 
2003; Grant, 2010).  Unfortunate interruptions in a household’s income stream 
and other trigger situations ‒ for which lenders or debtors have no control ‒ 
especially after a credit request has been granted often means a sudden inability 
to committee to repayment schedules even for small claims. If rational creditors 
validate potential borrowers’ creditworthiness ex-ante, then debtors will be able 
to carry as much debt as they desire (subject to the credit limit) without 
becoming delinquent (Chatterjee et al., 2007), but may still become delinquent 
should they suffer unfortunate changes in their circumstances ex-post (Getter, 
2003).  
 
To underscore the importance of trigger events, Disney et al. (2008), contends 
that the changes in the debtors’ circumstances do not necessary have to result 
in massive shifts in earnings in order for delinquencies to occur. It is often the 
surprise factor and the attempts to survive the immediate consequences of these 
negative situational changes that matter more for repayment performance. 
 
Additionally, the economic environment in which an individual lives or works 
should provide some information on his/her probability of delinquency risk as 
this determines one’s sensitivity to shock which (Avery et al., 2004; Grant, 
2010). Consumers who live/work in environments which highly exposes them 
to risk will face higher probabilities of delinquency. Such exposure can be 
empirically informed from family characteristics including dependency ratio, 
number of income sources, or the type and level of financial buffering (e.g., 
Avery et al., 2004; Alfaro et al., 2010).  
  
 In summation, shocks or trigger events do not only erode the consumer’s 
repayment capacity, but also, force consumers to act strategically to avoid 
jeopardising their day-to-day upkeep. Consumers may be forced to suspending 
manageable obligations if they realise that continuing to honour them might 
lead to further deteriorations in their wellbeing. Because the prevalence of 
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negative events beyond the market’s control suggests that consumers’ economic 
information and/or credit histories (at the time of consumption) are unlikely to 
suffice for risk assessment, the possibility of delinquency should be seen as an 
inevitable feature of the credit system (Viimsalu, 2010). In essence, this justifies 
the need for legal mechanisms to relieve unfortunate debtors of  their 
indebtedness should they find themselves under those situations, not only as a 
form of consumption insurance, but also to protect them from creditor actions 
such as, repossessions, or wage garnishments (see,  Niemi-Kiesiläinen & 
Henrikson, 2005; Van Apeldoorn, 2008).   
 
 
2.3 Other factors 
 
Besides excessive consumption and the occurrence of adverse shocks, another 
stream of literature focuses on institutional factors to explain debt delinquency. 
Essentially, these argue that the efficacy of predatory lending and insolvency 
regulations might be more relevant in explaining variations in debt 
delinquencies across countries. Namely, decisions to default may not only 
depend on the possible legal and social costs or the lack thereof (e.g.  Jentzsch 
& Riestra, 2006; Chatterjee et al., 2007), but also on the ease with which 
creditors can recover bad loans (see, Duygan-Bump & Grant, 2009). This seems 
to suggest that debt delinquency could be a strategic behaviour after all. 
Similarly, sanctions for predatory lending reduce the propensity for bad loan 
origination (Goodman & Smith, 2010; Ho & Pennington-Cross2006), whilst the 
tightness of information sharing regulations and infrastructure reduces poor 
judgement (Jappelli et al., 2008).  
 
Debt repayment performance might also be affected by life-cycle factors such 
as the path of labour incomes or consumption behaviours, which are affected 
by education and age (e.g.,  Kotlikoff, 2008; Lopes, 2008; Townley-Jones et al., 
2008). Given the paucity of previous empirical studies on the debt repayment 
performance of South African households, the variables used for this analysis 
are, for the most part, drawn from studies of other countries. Thus, the current 
study is largely exploratory in nature and contributes to this literature by 
examining empirically the relative importance of negative income shock and 
excessive spending on the consumer debt delinquency among South African 
households. 
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3. The data and analysis  
 
Household data from Wave one (2002), Wave three (2005) and Wave four 
(2006) of the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) ‒ a representative survey of 
households in metropolitan Cape Town ‒ were used for this investigation. To 
avoid possible biases that may result from attrition (of households), the 
subsample for this analysis comprises of only those households on which 
information was successfully collected in the all three waves (i.e., 2002, 2005 
and 2006) (n = 2549). 
 
The CAPS household survey not only collected information on household 
characteristics but also household income, expenditure, and debt participation. 
In particular it asks questions on whether the household was participating in 
non-housing debt and whether they have experienced problems paying these 
dates. The key question exploited for the current study is whether the household 
reports that it has been unable to make a scheduled payment on their consumer 
debt in the last 12 months prior to the 2006 survey. A household is considered 
to be delinquent in respect of their consumer (non-housing) debt if the 
respondent answered yes to the above question. Presumably the questionnaire 
respondent understood this question to refer to all consumer credit obligations, 
excluding any housing debt. Because this question cannot capture the severity 
of the household’s delinquency problem, it impossible to judge whether the 
non-payment was transitory or not. Nevertheless, this question should provide 
enough information on household repayment performance, considering that 
delinquency has a wide definition (citing Grant, 2010:5): from bankruptcy at 
one extreme to being a few weeks behind on some payments at the other, 
whatever the case, lenders will view any late payment as a risk of default. 
  
Following Bikker & Metzemakers (2005), the study defines negative shock as 
a surprise relative to expectation or as a negative situational change which might 
lead to an adverse shift in earnings, or increase claims on family resources. 
Insofar as the plans of economic agents are based on the current state of affairs, 
the economic outlook and expectations, any deviations from this state of affairs 
will affect the agents’ economic plans (Pesola, 2007). For this study, the timing 
of events is crucial, thus, the variables depicting adverse events are derived from 
households’ circumstances observed or self-reported during the 2002 and 2005 
waves of the survey with the assumption that those circumstances will affect 
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the repayment performance in the subsequent period (2006). The aim is to 
distinguish whether households react to the circumstances in the preceding 
period when they fail to pay their scheduled obligations. 
 
These variables were negative income shock, random negative shock (e.g., 
death or illness), expenditure shock (i.e., if households have to spend more on 
general expenditure than previously) and increase in family size. A subjective 
measure of financial pressure was also included2 to gauge whether households 
are able to avoid arrears even when they have genuine financial worries. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to distinguish whether these shocks were 
anticipated or unanticipated which would provide more insight into households’ 
consumption planning horizons and coping mechanisms. It could be assumed 
that households who anticipate negative swings in income might (or might not) 
choose to prioritise resources or make tougher sacrifices beforehand, so they 
may continue satisfying the obligations when due. Conversely, others might not 
have the luxury to deliberate on such decisions if they were to be caught off-
guard by unanticipated shocks.  
 
Because there is no information on the actual levels of indebtedness, the 
variable depicting excessive spending was derived from the households’ total 
expenditure (excluding housing rental or mortgage charges). This was measured 
as the ratio of the household’s total monthly expenditure to the household’s 
gross monthly income (expenses-to-income) following Kennedy et al. (2011) – 
on Irish households and Saunders & Hill (2008) – on Australian households. 
Expenses-to-income ratio represents the standard level of the household’s 
expenditure on commodities and services and therefore a good indicator of the 
level of household financial strain. Moreover, where the expenses-to-income 
ratio is very high, it raises doubts about relying on income alone to indicate the 
current living standard of the household (Saunders, 2011:50).   
 
Some variables related to credit quality were also included in the analysis to 
account for the assumption that some households are more likely to repay their 
obligations than others ‒ based on Katona’s (1960) exposition  of ‘ability to 
borrow’ (see, Roos, 2008; Zhu & Meeks, 1994). These were monthly per-capita 
																																								 																				
2 ‘How would this household classify its overall financial situation these days? Would you 
say it is very comfortable, comfortable, just getting by, poor, or very poor?’ (Financial 
pressure). 
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income, financial buffers and homeownership. While the financial buffers 
available in the data (having a saving account and/or life insurance) are quite 
modest, it should be noted that, in South Africa, access to these is still far from 
ubiquitous, even with recent market expansions. Thus assuming all else is equal, 
access to these assets comes with some degree of financial sophistication. Table 
2 below presents the definition of the variables of interest and their mean values 
for this subsample.  
 
It is revealed that 18% of the sub-sample reported being in arrears on their 
consumer debts in 2006. Between 2002 and 2005, 53% (1342) of the 2549 
households experienced negative incomes while 66% experienced expenditure 
shock during the same period. Households that reported experiencing a random 
negative event that may have had an impact their financial situation (e.g., death 
or illness of a family member) in 2005 were 19% of the subsample. On average, 
the sampled households used 65% of their incomes on general household 
expenditures. However, it is not known what the remainder was spend on. 
 









0.18 Binary variable (0/1): 1 if a household 
experienced arrears in 12 months preceding 
the 2006 survey, 0 otherwise. 
Expenses-to-
income  
0.65 Continuous; Total household expenditure in 
2005 divided by total income in 2005 (1st 
and 99th percentiles) [max .11 – min 3.1] 
(+). 
Family size▲ 0.50 Increase in family size (continuous variables 
of 2002 and 2005 family sizes compared). 
Dummy: 1 household had more members in 
2005 compared to 2002, 0 otherwise (+). 
Income shock 0.53 Decrease in income (Comparisons of 
household’s 2002 and 2005 net income). 
Dummy: 1 if 2005 income is less, 0 
otherwise (+). 
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Expenditure shock 0.66 Increase in expenditure. Dummy: 1 if the 
2005 household expenditure is greater than 
2002 expenditure, 0 otherwise (+). 
Random shock 0.19 Dummy: 1 if household reported at least one 
of the negative events listed in the year prior 
to the 2005 survey, 0 if none faced (+). 
Financial pressure 
 
0.67 Dummy: how respondent considers the 
family’s 2005 general financial situation to 
be (1= poor/very poor, 0= otherwise) (+). 
Per- capita income  R5 791 Continuous: Household per-capita income 
after deductions in 2005; [min R45 – max R 
20, 000] (-). 
Financial buffers  0.79 Continuous: If household had, life insurance, 
bank account, both of these together or none 
of them in 2005 (-). 
Homeownership  0.74 Dummy: 1 if family owns the primary 
residence in 2005; 0 otherwise 0 (-). 
 
Descriptive statistics were examined for each variable of interest and presented 
in Table 3 below including Chi-square measures of association between the 
household characteristics and the binary dependent variable (delinquent).  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of key variables for delinquent and non-
delinquent sample (N = 2549). 
 
 Non-delinquent Delinquent   
Variables Mean Mean Corr P* 
Excessive spending     
Expenses-to-income  0.64 0.65 0.003 .900 
Sources of shock     
Family size▲ 0.49 0.55 0.052 .009 
Income shock 0.51 0.58 0.055 .006 
Expenditure shock 0.65 0.73 0.061 .003 
Random shock 0.19 0.23 0.039 .049 
Financial pressure 0.66 0.72 0.052 .009 
Ability to borrow      
Homeownership  0.76 0.64 -0.106 .000 
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Per capita income (2005) R1, 460 R1, 336 -0.022 .268 
Financial buffers 0.63 0.64 0.003 .857 
Notes: Corr refers to bivariate correlation coefficients; P* Refers to chi-
square test for significance. 
 
The distribution of characteristics among the delinquent and non-delinquent 
households is presented as mean values including the bivariate correlation 
coefficients for the measures of the strength of the relationship between the 
‘delinquent’ variable and the individual independent variables. A statistically 
significant p value (p<0.05) suggests that one of categories of the variable 
depicting household characteristics is statistically significantly different from 
one of the categories of the dependent variable. 
 
The underlying problem is whether a household fails to repay its due financial 
obligations as a result of ‘excessive’ spending or due to negative income shocks 
‒ even where it might have been spending within its budget. Based on the 
bivariate relationships in Table 3 above, households are more likely to be in 
arrears if they experienced an income shock, a random negative shock, an 
expenditure shock, or increase in household size. These results are intuitive to 
the extent that these household circumstance will not only exert pressure on or 
reduce resources but might also be unanticipated at the time of the credit request. 
Households that self-reported being in financial distress were more likely to be 
in arrears on their consumer debts than those that did not. No relationship was 
observed between the household’s expenses-to-income ratio and delinquency. 
The relationship between credit quality and arrears is only supported by 
homeownership. Intuitively, just as homeownership might contribute positively 
to credit ratings, homeowners are also less likely to be delinquent on their 
consumer debts.  
 
Overall, the first signs presented by the bivariate relationships seem to suggest 
that consumer debt arrears are inevitable outcomes of unfortunate disruptions 
in consumers’ income streams and budget rather than the size of their 
expenditure burden.  Finally, the fact that the CAPS survey is not a typical 
survey of consumer finances and did not collect enough information on 
household income and expenditure, and given that the delinquency is self-
reported thereby suggesting a higher possibility of under-reporting, are major 
caveats which might affect the certitude of the conclusions drawn. 
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3.1 Logistic regression analysis 
 
What matters most for consumer debt delinquencies: excessive spending that 
renders borrowers financially over-stretched or shocks to income that erode 
repayment capacity?  
 
Because there is a definable probability that individuals will become delinquent 
on their financial obligations ‒ based on their characteristics ‒ (see, Greene 
1998), this dichotomous outcome (delinquent or non-delinquent) can only be 
reliably generated by probabilistic models, such as logit or probit. For this study, 
binary dependent variable logistic regression models were estimated to test 
whether a household’s reaction to circumstances over the preceding period 
affects its repayment performance over the following period. The relationship 
to be estimated takes the general form: 
 
*
it it itY Xβ ε= +'         (1) 
 
Where the dependent variable *itY is binary, taking the value of one if household 
i was delinquent at a period t in the 12 months preceding the 2006 survey and 0 
otherwise. The independent variables which represent household circumstances 
reported during the earlier surveys (2002 and 2005) are represented by X , while 
β  is the vector of their coefficients and itε is the idiosyncratic error. There are 
three groups of independent variables (negative shocks, expenses-to-income 








PL X X X
P
β β β β ε⎛ ⎞= = + + + +⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
      (2) 
 
Where: 
1X  is the matrix of shock effects 
2X  is the matrix of measures of excessive spending 
3X  is the matrix of ability to consume 
ε  is the error term 
 
If *itY  is large enough in relation to these characteristics, then the household is 
delinquent on their consumer debts and this probability is represented by: 
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Prob[ 1| ]it it itP Y X= =         (3) 
 
If the error term is normally distributed (i.e., mean 0 and variance 1), then the 
delinquency probability should be expressed as: 
*Pr ob[ 1| ] Prob[ 0 | ] Prob[ | ] Ф( )it it it it it it itY X Y X X X Xε β β= = > = ≤ =' '        (4) 
 
Where Ф( )is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (see, Evans 
et al., 2002), classified as: 
1itY =  if *Ф( )itX Pβ >'                                                                                         (5) 
 
To test the effect of excessive spending on repayment performance, quintiles of 
the household expenditure burden (expenses-to-income ratio) were created to 
see if households at the top of the distribution of the expenditure burden are 
more likely to experience repayment difficulties. Breaking the variable into 
quintiles reduces the likelihood of heteroscedasticity in the regression analysis. 
Households with the expenditure burden below the first percentile and above 
the 99th percentile were eliminated as extreme outliers. 
 
Comparing household income between the 2002 and 2005 waves of the survey 
made it possible to identify households who experienced an income shock. 
Dummies for random shock, expenditure shock, increase in family size, and 
subjective financial pressure were also included to see if other sources of 
financial strain matter for delinquency.  
 
In addition, some modest wealth related effects (i.e., homeownership, financial 
buffers, and per capita income) are included in the analysis to control for credit 
quality. In essence, the model estimated is a combination of household 
characteristics visible to lenders in credit applications and the unobservable 
ones (ex-post shocks) which should affect the size of the error term in lenders’ 
credit scoring algorithms. 
 
Multivariate logistic regression models are specified in a framework that 
assumes that, if households pass lenders’ due diligence, then subsequent 
repayment difficulties will not result from the fact that they consumed 
excessively, rather from ex-post disruptions in their income streams. In other 
words, the level of consumption is only indicative of the ability to borrow ‒ 
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subject to idiosyncratic constraints. Hence the coefficients on the dummies for 
the expenses-to-income ratio, if significant, are expected to be negative. 
 
Thus, households are expected to experience repayment difficulties if they 
experience shocks to their incomes. Therefore, the coefficients for income 
shock, random shock, expenditure shock, increase in family size, and subjective 
financial pressure are expected to be positive. Having to content with higher 
than normal expenditure needs or with more family members should have the 
same effect as other events that reduce income. Finally, repayment difficulties 
are expected to be negatively related to homeownership, financial buffers, and 





The logistic regression results (coefficients and their robust standard errors) 
appear in the Table 4. All the coefficients of the variables have the expected 
signs whether significant or not. The most notable finding is that all the 
variables representing financially adverse circumstance were robust and 
positive ‒ even when controlling credit quality. 
 
Experiencing a reduction in income increases the risk that the household will 
not pay its debts when due, possibly because they lose the capacity to do so or 
they might be forced to divert the resources to other more binding expenditures 
as a way of preventing further deterioration in family welfare. Other such 
variables that negatively affect the ability of households to meet their payment 
obligations on time were random negative events (e.g., death, illness or divorce), 
increase in expenditure needs and increase in family size. Although this could 
not be deduced from the data, such variables could represent adverse changes 
in household circumstances after a credit request has been granted. Indeed, 
indebted households may become suddenly unable to committee to their 
repayment obligation if they should experience a negative trigger event such as 
an inability to work through injury. The extra costs of dealing with these random 
events and/or the resultant reduction in income might even damage or erode the 
value of precautionary wealth. Additionally, unanticipated increase in the cost 
of living (e.g., through increases in family size and/or budgetary requirements) 
might have the same effect even when incomes remain stable. 
	 16  
	
  
Families who reported feeling financial pressure were more likely to be 
delinquent on their consumer debt repayments. If families feel that their 
financial situation is poorer than it should be, they are likely to exercise greater 
caution when choosing how to spend their money. They may skip payments in 
order to prioritise resources at least in the interim.  
 
Another important finding is that there is no compelling evidence to suggest 
that excessive spending is related to consumer debt delinquency. The 
expenditure burden was only significant at the lower end of the distribution of 
variable (second quintile) and negative while other quintiles were not 
statistically significant. The results were similar even when controlling for 
credit quality. One possible explanation for this would be that any level of 
expenditure is subject to a certain limit. Those who buy with cash will only buy 
as much as their cash can allow, whilst those who depend on credit to finance 
consumption will be constrained by lenders’ credit limits ‒ commensurate with 
their capacity to repay. Note that rational lenders are less likely to invite 
financial losses by lending more than what consumers can comfortably repay. 
As such, the level of consumption undertaken will be only a reflection of a 
consumer’ capacity to consumer (or solvency) rather than a crisis 
 
Of the three covariates of credit quality, only homeownership was significant 
and negatively related to delinquency while per-capita income, and financial 
buffers were insignificant. This result is not surprising given that lenders are 
able to observe these characteristics before the credit is granted and therefore, 
will not matter for future repayment performance. Since household wealth 
status can change after the credit has been consumed, it is sensible that current 
per-capita income, and/or financial assets will not be related to later 
delinquencies as debts are expected to be paid from future incomes. While the 
negative sign on homeownership is intuitive, homeownership is a weak 
indicator of wealth in South Africa since the government’s RDP policy has 
enable many poor people to own homes while many rich people are renters. 
 
A similar analysis was conducted only on households who experienced a 
negative income shock (first column on the right) and those whose income 
increased or remained stable (second column from right). In both analyses, 
excessive spending was not related to delinquency. For households whose 
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income remained stable or increased, random negative shock and expenditure 
shock were the primary determinants of delinquency. Even where incomes meet 
or exceed expectations, households are still likely to experience repayment 
difficulties if they should suffer from negative trigger events that affect 
expenditure needs especially since many South Africans are inadequately 
insurance against risk (see, e.g., Collins & Leibbrandt 2007). 
  
In the model conditional on experiencing negative income shock, expenditure 
shock was the primary determinant of debt delinquency. This suggests that, 
household consumption needs can be binding and will not necessary respond to 
the negative changes in financial circumstances. Household will still need to 
cater for their dependents’ ongoing subsistence even when they experience 
negative income shocks. To manage this, rational households might decide to 
abandon or defer their repayment obligations.  
 
Table 3: Default risk logistic model for income shock and excessive 
spending 
	
 Dependent Variable: Delinquent = 1 
                            Not delinquent = 0 









     
Income shock 0.01*** 0.02**   
 (0.01) (0.01)   
Random shock 0.32** 0.37*** 0.75*** 0.05 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.20) (0.18) 
Expenditure 
shock  
0.41*** 0.49*** 0.43** 0.66*** 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.20) (0.20) 
Family size▲ 0.26** 0.23** 0.30* 0.19 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) (0.15) 
Financial 
pressure 
0.37*** 0.36*** 0.29 0.37** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.20) (0.17) 




-0.36** -0.37** -0.38 -0.35 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.26) (0.25) 
Exp-to-income 
3 
-0.28 -0.31 -0.42 -0.17 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.26) (0.24) 
Exp-to-income 
4 
0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.03 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.26) (0.23) 
Exp-to-income 
5 
-0.18 -0.20 -0.19 -0.05 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.30) (0.23) 
Per capita 
income 
 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Financial assets  0.28* 0.24 0.19 
  (0.16) (0.28) (0.20) 
Homeownershi
p  
 -0.65*** -0.49** -0.74*** 
  (0.12) (0.19) (0.15) 
Intercept -2.15*** -1.86*** -2.00*** -1.88*** 
 (0.20) (0.26) (0.42) (0.36) 
     
N 2,316 2,282 1,076 1,206 
Log likelihood -1070.84 -1037.92 -445.12 -587.46 
AIC 2161.69 2101.83 914.24 1198.92 
chi2 49.515 83.079 42.252 43.808 
Pseudo R2 0.022 0.038 0.042 0.037 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; AIC refers to: Akaike 
information criterion for measure of the relative goodness of fit. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
In a nutshell, the evidence suggests that income shocks and other trigger events 
that increase strains on the family budget are more important in explaining 
consumer debt repayment difficulties than the household’s expenditure burden. 
It is important to acknowledge that excessive spending might render some 
households more sensitive to trigger events. Some consumers might be treading 
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on the edge and borrowing on top of huge outstanding bills. Naturally, such 
consumers will be more sensitive to trigger events than the average consumer 
who borrows sparingly.  Nonetheless, excessive spending does not appear to be 
important overall. These findings support the hypothesis formulated. 
 
 
4. Conclusion and Implications  
 
This analysis used the CAPS data to investigate whether South African 
households were more likely to be delinquent on their consumer debts as a result 
of shocks that negatively affect their economic circumstances or as a result of 
excessive expenditure that renders households financially overstretched. The 
findings of the logistic regression analysis indicate that households are more 
likely to experience debt repayment difficulties if they suffer from negative 
income shocks and other circumstances that alter their financial circumstances. 
The level of household expenditure burden (expenses-to-income ratio) was not 
significantly related to arrears ‒ even when controlling for household’s ex-ante 
ability to repay (i.e., credit quality). The inference then, is that, insofar as 
lenders evaluate risk, they will only lend amounts consumers are able and 
willing to repay such that the size of the repayment burden will only reflect a 
household’s ability to access credit rather than delinquency risk.  
 
Because lenders have an intrinsic profit motive and an aversion to loss, they 
will have no incentive to see households borrowing more than they can 
comfortably repay rather, they have a greater incentive to self-regulate. This 
suggests two things: first, excessive spending is less likely to be a major factor 
in the repayment performance for the majority of credit-active households. 
Second, the concept of reckless lending might be over exaggerated in the well-
meaning academic and political discourses, perhaps even a myth.  
 
Complementary to the above, the importance of trigger events suggests that 
even where households borrow within their means, repayment difficulties are 
still likely to occur if households should experience ex-post disruptions in their 
income streams. This suggests further that, while traditional credit risk 
evaluation procedures might reduce the preponderance arrear on consumer debt, 
their inability to account for the likelihood of shock means that consumer debt 
problems cannot be completely eliminated. Credit underwriters would do well 
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to incorporate situational factors in their credit risk models. Predictive models 
should incorporate as many variables that measure sensitivity to shock as 
possible. Factors such as local economic conditions, overall dependency or type 
and level of insurance, among others, should provide some information to the 
end. 
 
Overall, it is unlikely that there will be enough information to warn lenders of 
the possibility that debtors will experience economic shock post-consumption. 
Given this perspective, it makes sense to accept consumer debt delinquency (or 
over-indebtedness) as an inevitable feature of the credit system. The implication 
for credit regulation in this respect is clear. In a context like South Africa where 
idiosyncratic shocks are widespread and often have longer lasting consequences, 
tighter regulations on credit granting cannot be enough to eradication debt 
delinquency (i.e., because factors responsible for debt repayment difficulties are 
often beyond lenders and consumers’ control). Post-consumption regulatory 
interventions with tightly regulated measures for relief and rehabilitation of 
consumers’ indebtedness are as important, if not more so. The current 
legislation (the NCA) falls far short in this respect, and this is to be expected, 
given that the arguments that preceded its formulation solely blamed consumer 
debt problems on lenders’ irresponsible practices. Neither the DTI’s policy 
document, nor the politicians in the portfolio committee saw consumer debt 
problems as a function of circumstances beyond lenders’ and consumers’ 
control and that was a costly oversight which needs to be revisited.  
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